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This paper proposes a model where ﬁrms choose simultaneously the quality
and quantity of investment. The quality characteristics of capital goods (e.g.
energy eﬃciency) can be chosen ex ante, but remain ﬁxed ex post. As a result,
Tobin’s average q is not a suﬃcient statistic for the explanation of investment;
the improved quality of capital goods due to energy price increases provides
another, independent motive which can be characterized in a simple way in
this model. On the one hand, the model provides a tractable tool for the
analysis of investment demand, because of its recursive structure. On the
other hand, the putty-clay structure provides a new explanation of the puzzle
why conventional estimates of marginal adjustment costs are strongly biased
upwards. Simulations with a calibrated model suggest that, in the context of
energy price shocks, “true” marginal adjustment costs might be overestimated
by a factor of ﬁve.
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Neoclassical models of investment demand with convex adjustment costs have not
performed well in empirical studies.1 In the early literature,most econometric stud-
ies using the q-model of investment found parameter values that imply very high
marginal adjustment costs. If these results were taken literally,expected proﬁtabil-
ity would have very little eﬀect on investment. Recent research has corrected and
extended the earlier work in several respect. First,more sophisticated economet-
ric techniques have been employed in order to deal with problems of measurement
error; they have yielded more plausible estimates. Second,diﬀerent assumptions
concerning the adjustment cost function have been explored. For example,increas-
ing returns in the adjustment technology lead to lumpiness of investment. Third,
the eﬀects of irreversibility and uncertainty on ﬁrms’ investment decisions have been
modeled,explaining in particular why ﬁrms use high hurdle rates (Abel and Eberly,
1994; Dixit and Pindyck,1994).
This paper takes a diﬀerent direction. Instead of focusing on the issue of adjust-
ment costs,it extends the traditional model of investment with convex adjustment
costs by taking the putty-clay relation between capital and energy into account. This
assumption can be intuitively justiﬁed by the observation that energy eﬃciency is
part of the design of the capital good: it can be chosen ex ante,but there is not
much scope to change energy use ex post. Moreover,Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) have
shown recently that a putty-clay model of capital and energy reproduces quite well
the evolution of energy use and of the energy-capital ratio in aggregate US data.
It is well known that average and marginal q diﬀer in putty-clay models (see
e.g.,Abel,1990). This property holds also in the present model,where Tobin’s
(1969) average q is not the only determinant of investment. The improved quality of
capital goods due to energy price increases provides another,independent motive,
for which an explicit expression is derived below. If this view of the investment
process is correct,conventional investment models are misspeciﬁed and give biased
results. This bias can be severe in the context of energy price shocks: simulation
analysis of the period 1974-1994 concludes that marginal adjustment costs might be
overestimated by a factor of ﬁve.
In the model,ﬁrms choose simultaneously the quantity and the quality of the
capital good. At each point in time,there is a continuum of diﬀerent qualities
available. “Quality” can be interpreted here as the energy eﬃciency which char-
1For recent surveys of investment models, see Caballero (1999), Chirinko (1993) and Hassett
and Hubbard (1997).
1acterizes the capital good. Despite this general setup,the model turns out to be
highly tractable,for two reasons. First,the “curse of dimensionality”,from which
traditional putty-clay models suﬀer,is avoided here by assuming that all capital
vintages are fully utilized. Second,the analysis of investment demand is simpliﬁed
by the recursivity of the model,which is due to the speciﬁcation of adjustment costs.
It is useful to consider these two aspects in turn.
Traditional putty-clay models suﬀer from the “curse of dimensionality”,since one
has to keep track of all past capital vintages. Indeed,these models are based on the
assumption that the relation between labor and capital is putty-clay and determine
endogenously whether a particular capital vintage is (fully) utilized or not (e.g.
Solow,1962). By contrast,the situation is diﬀerent if the capital is putty-clay in
terms of energy eﬃciency. Energy represents a small proportion of the total costs
of capital and energy; it is therefore highly unlikely that a given capital vintage is
removed from operation because of a change in energy prices. This idea is formalized
by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) who use aggregate US data to show that in a putty-
clay model of energy and capital,the probability that some capital vintage is left idle
is vanishingly small. Thus the assumption that all capital vintages are fully utilized
has a ﬁrm justiﬁcation. This assumption allows to simplify the model considerably:
two state variables are suﬃcient to describe the quantity and (energetic) quality of
the aggregate capital stock.
The analysis is simpliﬁed even further by the fact that the model is partly recur-
sive. First,the ﬁrm chooses the energetic quality of the capital equipment based on
discounted expected energy prices,independently of the investment quantity deci-
sion. Second,the ﬁrm decides upon the volume of investment,taking the previously
chosen energy eﬃciency into account. This particular recursive structure results
from the assumption that (convex) adjustment cost apply to the quantity of invest-
ment,and not to its quality. This assumption implies for example that a ﬁrm incurs
identical adjustment costs for two machines with identical production capacities,
even if their speciﬁc energy consumption diﬀers. It does not mean,however,that
quality improvement has no cost. Indeed,a highly energy-eﬃcient equipment entails
higher acquisition costs than a low-quality equipment.
How can the traditional assumption of convex adjustment costs lead to such a
large bias in conventional estimates of adjustment cost parameters,as the simulation
analysis in this paper suggests? There are two reasons. First,the quality-corrected
measure of investment (which is conventionally used in econometric studies) falls
less after an energy price shock than the unadjusted measure (which determines ad-
2justment costs in the model of this paper),since the choice of more energy-eﬃcient
equipment compensates in part the fall in the quantity of investment. As a conse-
quence,even if marginal q is used as independent variable in the regression,results
are biased. Second,the wedge between marginal and average q depends on energy
price shocks. In the case of an unexpected energy price increase,the variation of
average q tends to overstate the variation in investment incentives (i.e. in marginal
q). On the one hand,an unexpected shock leads to a sudden decrease in the market
value of the existing capital stock,and therefore to a fall in average q. On the other
hand,the second incentive to invest,which is rooted in the fact that investment
improves the energy eﬃciency of the capital stock,plays a greater role in periods
following energy price shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the investment model,which is set up in a deterministic framework. Section 3
establishes that the model can be solved recursively and discusses the choice of en-
ergy eﬃciency. Section 4 derives an equation of investment demand and gives an
interpretation of the wedge between marginal and average q. Section 5 analyzes
the dynamic properties of the model and examines the consequences of an energy
price shock. Section 6 describes the simulation exercise: a conventional q-model of
investment is estimated econometrically on data that is generated by simulating a
calibrated putty-clay investment model. Finally,the appendix discusses the neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions for optimality in the investment model. This model
is an interesting example of an optimal control problem where suﬃcient conditions
can only be established through a change in state variables.
2 The model
Capital equipment can only produce services by using energy and other inputs,such
as operating and maintenance services,and by jointly producing other outputs,
such as emissions. Moreover,energy eﬃciency and other speciﬁc input requirements
(or speciﬁc emission coeﬃcients) are embodied in the capital equipment. Thus
they can be considered as quality characteristics. To simplify the presentation,it is
assumed here that there is only one quality characteristic which diﬀerentiates capital
goods. This quality characteristic, η,can be thought of as being the speciﬁc energy
consumption of the capital good.2
2All variables are functions of time t. The time variable is omitted unless it is essential for
understanding.
3For a given productive capacity of the capital good,there is a continuum of
diﬀerent qualities available. A high-quality good is more expensive than a low-
quality good; this price diﬀerential can be interpreted as a monetary measure of
embodied quality. A cost index of quality, θ,can thus be deﬁned by comparing,for
a given productive capacity,the costs of capital goods characterized by diﬀerent η,
to some base design. This relation can be described by the function θ = θ(η,t),
which has the following properties:
θ(η,t) > 0,θ η(η,t) < 0,θ t(η,t) < 0,θ ηη(η,t) > 0, (1)
where θη (θηη) denotes the ﬁrst-order (second-order) partial derivative of θ with
respect to η. The inﬂuence of embodied technical change on the relation between η
and θ is captured by the time argument t.
Note that the function θ can be derived from an ex-ante constant-returns-to-
scale production function I = g[ˆ I,e,t],where I denotes investment (i.e. capital of
the latest vintage) measured in terms of productive capacity, ˆ I = θI is the neoclas-
sical measure of investment which accounts also for the energy-saving component
of capital,and e = ηI is energy required for the use of I. Dividing by I yields
g[θ,η,t] = 1,which deﬁnes implicitly the function θ,as an isoquant of the ex-ante
production function g.
Now turn to the determination of the capital stock,measured in units of pro-
duction capacity. The capital stock can be obtained by cumulating past investment.
Assume that capital goods deteriorate at a constant rate δ,so that the capital stock






where I(s) designates the stock of capital goods of vintage s (or gross investment
at time s),measured in units of production capacity. Deriving this expression with
respect to time yields the familiar equation of permanent inventory:
˙ K = I − δK, (2)
where a dot over a variable denotes the derivative of that variable with respect to
time.
How is the average quality of the capital stock determined? Since speciﬁc energy
consumption is embodied in each capital vintage,the energy use of a given vintage
cannot be changed after it is installed. Moreover,the capital stock is assumed to be
4fully utilized.3 Total energy demand E is given by the sum of energy demands linked
to all surviving capital vintages. Thus,it depends on past investment decisions and


















Obviously,¯η is a weighted average of speciﬁc energy consumptions chosen in the
past. The weights reﬂect the importance of surviving vintages in the capital stock.
Deriving (3) with respect to time yields the following diﬀerential equation,describing
the evolution of average speciﬁc energy consumption:
˙ ¯ η =( I/K)(η − ¯ η). (4)
This equation shows that the average quality is not adjusted immediately to the
desired level,since it can be changed only by replacing old ineﬃcient vintages and
by adding new,more energy-eﬃcient equipment to the existing capital stock. Note
that the model is greatly simpliﬁed by the fact that the evolution of ¯ η does not
depend on the entire vintage structure of the capital stock,which is due to the
assumption of a constant deterioration rate δ.
It is useful to deﬁne a neoclassical measure of the capital stock,which accounts
also for the energy-saving component of capital: ˆ K =
  t
−∞ ˆ I(s)exp[−δ(t − s)]ds.
On average,the energy-saving component of capital is given by ¯ θ = ˆ K/K,which
evolves according to:
˙ ¯ θ =( I/K)(θ − ¯ θ). (5)
Output Y is produced using the services of capital equipment and of other pro-
duction factors,among which only labor L will be considered for simplicity. As the
capital stock is fully utilized,capital services are proportional to the capital stock
3This assumption is much less restrictive than it may seem at ﬁrst sight. Atkeson and Kehoe
(1999) construct a putty-clay model whose structure is close to the present framework, but where
the utilization of the diﬀerent capital vintages is chosen endogenously. They establish a rule
determining a cutoﬀ level η∗: all capital vintages τ characterized by η(τ) <η ∗ are fully utilized
(all other vintages are not utilized at all). Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) then argue that in empirical
applications all capital vintages are fully utilized with probability close to one. Indeed, because of
the small share of energy in the total cost of capital services, extremely large variations in energy
prices would be needed to make the cutoﬀ rule binding.
5K. The production function,assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale,can then
be written as follows:
Y = f(K,L)( 6 )
Energy does not appear in this production function because it is not directly pro-
ductive,but is only needed in order to operate the capital stock. 4 As described
above in equation (3),energy demand is linked to the capital stock in a way that
can be interpreted as a bottom-up relationship: E =¯ ηK.
It is assumed that there are convex adjustment costs,denoted by C,which are
internal to the ﬁrm. Following Abel and Blanchard (1983),they depend both on
the level and the rate of investment:
C(I,K)=Ih (I/K),h
  > 0, 2h
  +( I/K)h
   > 0,h (δ)=0 . (7)
Thus C is increasing and convex with respect to I and is zero if no net investment
is undertaken.
The ﬁrm is assumed to minimize its costs over an inﬁnite horizon. This opti-
mization problem can be solved in two stages (Berndt et al.,1981). First,the ﬁrm
minimizes its short-run variable costs; then it minimizes total costs in the long run.
Since energy is linked to capital,it is not considered as a variable factor,and the
ﬁrst stage amounts to minimizing labor costs. A variable cost function V can be
deﬁned as follows: V (w,K,Y)=m i n L{wL | f(K,L)=Y },where w is the wage
rate. In the long run,the ﬁrm incurs,besides variable costs,the costs of energy and
of investment goods,and adjustment costs. Total instantaneous cost at a point in
time is therefore given by:
Γ=wL+ vE + pI + C(I,K)=V (w,K,Y)+v¯ ηK + I [θ(η)+h(I/K)] (8)






−rtdt, s.t. (2), (4),K (0) = K0, ¯ η(0) = ¯ η0. (9)
4Note that the description of production given by equation (6) is equivalent with the following





6For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality,the real interest rate r is
assumed to be constant.
The next two sections discuss the properties of the optimal choice of invest-
ment quality and quantity. The complete necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the
optimal control problem (9) are derived in the appendix.5
3 Choice of energy eﬃciency
In the model,the ﬁrm chooses simultaneously the quantity I and the quality η of
the capital equipment. It turns out that the speciﬁc energy consumption is chosen
independently from the quantity of investment. Indeed,equations (A4),(A6) and
( A 7 ) ,g i v e ni nt h ea p p e n d i x ,c a nb er e w r i t t e na s :
˙ ν = −v + ν(r + δ) (10)
ν = −θη(η,t) (11)
lim
t→∞e
−rtν(t) = 0 (12)
where ν is equal to the negative of the multiplier µE in the appendix. Thus νK0
measures the impact of a marginal increase in the initial average speciﬁc energy
consumption ¯ η0 on the present discounted value of future costs. Obviously, ν is
determined by (10) and (12),independently of the other endogenous variables of
the model. Furthermore,(11) shows that the quality of the latest vintage η depends
only on ν. This is suﬃcient to prove that the model is recursive. The choice of the
control variables can thus be seen as a three-stage process. First,the shadow price
ν is determined,then the speciﬁc energy consumption is chosen,and ﬁnally the ﬁrm
decides upon the volume of investment.
How is the energy eﬃciency of new investment goods chosen in the model? Using






Thus the shadow price ν at time t is equal to the present discounted value of fu-
5Note that the Hamiltonian associated with problem (9) is not jointly concave with respect
to the control and state variables. The suﬃciency conditions of the Mangasarian theorem can
therefore not be applied to this problem. The weaker conditions of the Arrow theorem are not
satisﬁed either. As shown in the appendix, there exists a canonical change in variables which
transforms the original problem in such a way that the conditions of both theorems are fulﬁlled.
The proposed change in variables consists in replacing the state variable ¯ η by energy demand,
E =¯ ηK.
7ture energy prices. The optimal choice of energy eﬃciency is well described by the
combination of equations (11) and (13). Speciﬁc energy consumption of the invest-
ment good is chosen in such a way that,at the margin,the reduction in the cost
of the investment good that could be obtained by opting for a less energy-eﬃcient
equipment is exactly oﬀset by the increased future energy costs implied by such a
decision.
To simplify the following presentation,it is useful to introduce the inverse func-
tion of −θη,denoted by φ. Assumption (1) ensures its existence: since θ is convex,
−θη is a monotonically decreasing function of η. From equations (11) and (13),the
speciﬁc energy consumption is therefore given by:
η = φ(ν,t) (14)
Since θ(η) is convex by assumption, φν < 0 for all ν>0. This implies that speciﬁc
energy consumption is strictly decreasing in expected energy prices and strictly
increasing in the expected real interest rate.
4 Investment demand
Having chosen the quality of the investment good,the ﬁrm determines the volume
of investment. As marginal and average q diﬀer in this putty-clay model,the in-
vestment decision depends not only on average q,but also on embodied technical
change and on variations in the present value of expected energy prices.
To establish this result,it is useful to determine ﬁrst the market value of capital.
In the neoclassical investment model,the market value of capital is equal to the
present value of expected marginal products of capital services. In the present model,
capital services can only be provided by incurring energy costs. This is reﬂected in
the expression of the shadow price of K,which is obtained from equations (A3) and
(A7) in the appendix:





Assuming perfect competition on the output market,the market value of total
capital stock at time t = 0 is equal to the present value of expected proﬁts:
Π(0) =
  ∞
0 Y (t)exp(−rt)dt−Ω(0),(where the output price is normalized to unity).
Along the lines of Hayashi (1982),it can be shown that Π(0) = λK(0)K0,ar e s u l t
that can be extended for any t.
8Average q can now be determined as the ratio between the ﬁrm’s market value,
Π,and its replacement cost. As the average quality of the capital stock is ¯η,its
replacement cost is given by θ(¯ η,t)K,and average q becomes: qA = λK/θ(¯ η,t).
Marginal q diﬀers from average q because the quality of the latest capital vintage,
η,is diﬀerent from the average quality of the stock. The market value of the latest
vintage is equal to λK + ν(¯ η − η),6 and its replacement cost is θ(η,t). Therefore,
marginal q is given by qM =[ λK + ν(¯ η − η)]/θ(η,t).
Turn now to the investment equation,which can be derived from the necessary
conditions of the cost minimization problem. Substituting equation (14) into (A5),
given in the appendix,yields:
CI = µK − νφ(ν,t) − θ[φ(ν,t),t].
Assumptions (7) imply that CI is a strictly increasing function of the investment
rate I/K,crossing the origin. Therefore,the inverse of this function exists and is
denoted by ψ. From (7),it is clear that ψ is increasing and that ψ(0) = δ. Using
(15),the investment equation can then be written as:
I/K = ψ {λK + ν[¯ η − φ(ν,t)] − θ[φ(ν,t),t]} (16)
H o wd o e st h i se q u a t i o nr e l a t et ot h eq-theory of investment? In terms of marginal
q,investment demand is given by: I/K = ψ[θ(η,t)(qM − 1)]. To establish the link
with empirical work,it is useful to see how investment demand relates to average q.
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where η = φ(ν,t). Equation (17) illustrates the double role of gross investment.
On the one hand,investment increases production capacity. Thus,average q is a
determinant of the investment rate. On the other hand,gross investment improves
the average energy eﬃciency of the capital stock by adding equipment of the latest,
(supposedly) more energy-eﬃcient,vintage to the existing stock. Because of this
quality-upgrading,the ﬁrm will be able to save on future energy costs. This second
motive for investment is captured by the term X. Figure 1 shows X as the vertical
6If one unit of capital (with quality η) is added to the existing capital stock, K increases by one
unit and E =¯ ηK by η units, since ∆E =¯ η∆K + K∆¯ η = η∆K, where ∆¯ η =( η − ¯ η)∆K/K [from
(4)]. Thus the shadow price of the latest capital vintage is µK +µEη = µK −νη = λK +ν(¯ η −η).
9θ(η,t)
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Figure 1: Change in energy eﬃciency and investment incentives
distance between the function θ and the isocost line,measured at the average quality
of the capital stock. This distance can be interpreted as follows. The ﬁrm would be
indiﬀerent between qualities η and ¯ η if the unit cost of the latter quality were equal
to ˜ θ. The diﬀerence between the eﬀective cost of quality ¯ η, θ(¯ η,t),and ˜ θ is equal
to Xθ(η,t). Therefore, X represents the gain that a ﬁrm can make by choosing
quality η rather than ¯ η,expressed as a share of the investment good’s acquisition
cost θ(η,t).
How is X related to the parameters of the model? As Figure 1 illustrates,two
factors determine the size of X: the gap between the quality of the latest vintage
and the average quality (η − ¯ η),on the one hand,and the curvature of the function
θ,on the other hand. This intuition can be made more precise with the help of the
following second-order Taylor expansion:
θ(¯ η,t)=θ(η,t)+(¯ η − η)θη(η,t)+( 1 /2)(¯ η − η)
2θηη(η,t)+R2. (18)
10Neglecting the Lagrange remainder R2,equation (18) allows to rewrite X as follows:7
X   (1/2)
θηη(η,t)
θ(η,t)













where σ is the ex-ante elasticity of substitution between energy and capital, se is
the (expected) cost share of energy and sk(= 1−se) the cost share of capital in the
ex-ante composite I.
It is clear from (19) that most of the variability in X can be expected from the
variability of the term [(¯ η − η)/η]2,since the structural parameters se, sk and σ
tend to be rather stable. On the one hand,such variability occurs during periods of
large (unexpected) changes in energy prices. On the other hand,investment-speciﬁc
technological shocks might also be responsible for the volatility of X. In the latter
case,the factor bias of those shocks is crucial: only energy-saving technical change
might lead to large changes in [(¯ η −η)/η]2. As the information on the factor bias of
technological shocks is currently lacking,this issue is not pursued further here. 8
5 Dynamic properties of the model
This section shows that the (local) dynamic behavior of the model can be analyzed
in a recursive way,using a suitable change in variables. Thus,the dynamic response
to exogenous shocks (e.g. a technological shock,discussed in the next section) can
be analyzed in a simple and transparent way.
The dynamics of ﬁrm behavior can be described by a system of four diﬀerential
equations governing the paths of the state variables K and ¯ η and of their shadow
prices,and by transversality conditions (12) and (A7). In the general case,it is
diﬃcult to analyze a system of this order. In the present model,however,the
system can be simpliﬁed by a change in variables. Replacing λK by µK = λK + ν¯ η
7The (second) equality in (19) is obtained as follows. Note ﬁrst that − ηθη/θ = νe/ˆ I can be



























8Greenwood et al. (2000) analyze the role of investment-speciﬁc technological shocks in business
cycles. In their model, technological shocks aﬀect the eﬃciency of (the latest vintage of) capital,
without inﬂuencing the eﬃciency of other inputs.
11leads to the following system of diﬀerential equations:9
˙ ν = −v + ν(r + δ) (20)
˙ µK = −Ψ
2h
 (Ψ) + VK(w,K,Y)+µK(r + δ) (21)
˙ K =( Ψ − δ)K (22)
˙ ¯ η =( φ(ν,t) − ¯ η)Ψ (23)
where Ψ = ψ(µK − νφ(ν,t) − θ[φ(ν,t),t]) denotes the investment rate.
The properties close to equilibrium of this system can be analyzed by linearizing
the system of diﬀerential equations at the steady state equilibrium (where technical
change comes to a halt). As a ﬁrst step,the equilibrium values of the endogenous
variables are determined,assuming that all exogenous variables remain constant
after a certain date. Setting derivatives with respect to time to zero yields η =¯ η





















where the equilibrium values of endogenous variables are denoted by a star (∗),and
η =¯ η∗ and I = δK∗.
The linearized dynamic system is easier to analyze than the original system
because it is even more recursive,since the average speciﬁc energy consumption,¯η,
is determined independently of the investment rate. Therefore,the local dynamics of
energy eﬃciency can be studied independently of the local dynamics of investment.
The optimal path of the shadow price of energy can be determined as follows.
Combining equations (20) and (24) yields: ˙ ν =( r + δ)(ν − ν∗). Because of the
transversality condition (12),the unique solution of this equation is given by: ν(t)=
ν(0) = ν∗. This implies that the shadow price of energy immediately jumps to
its new equilibrium after a shock. Close to equilibrium,the evolution of average
speciﬁc energy consumption is governed by: ˙ ¯ η = δφ (ν∗)(ν − ν∗) − δ(¯ η − ¯ η∗). Since
ν jumps instantaneously to its equilibrium value,this equation simpliﬁes to: ˙ ¯ η =
−δ(¯ η − ¯ η∗). Consequently,¯η converges towards its equilibrium value at rate δ.T h e
9The system is obtained from equations (2), (4), (10) and (A3). In these equations, control
variables I and η are replaced by their expressions in terms of the state variables.
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Figure 2: Dynamics of average speciﬁc energy consumption
phase diagram shown in ﬁgure 2 summarizes the dynamics of ¯ η and ν.10
The fact that ν jumps immediately to its equilibrium value simpliﬁes considerably
the analysis of capital stock dynamics. In the neighborhood of equilibrium,the


















where ψ (∗)=ψ {µ∗
K − ν∗φ(ν∗) − θ[φ(ν∗)]}. This system of diﬀerential equations
is formally identical to the system describing neoclassical investment demand.11
However,the economic interpretation of the shadow price diﬀers: the shadow price
of the capital stock,appearing in the neoclassical model,is replaced in this model
by the shadow price of capital services,which includes energy costs.
Close to equilibrium,the dynamics of the capital stock and of the shadow price
µK are described by the phase diagram in ﬁgure 3. The capital stock is constant
on the horizontal line deﬁned by: µK = µ∗
K. The shadow price µK is constant on
the negatively sloped curve,which is given by the following equation: µK − µ∗
K =
−(1/r)VK(w,K∗,Y)(K − K∗). The equilibrium (K∗,µ ∗
K) is a saddle point. Thus,
10Average speciﬁc consumption is constant on the curve labeled ˙ ¯ η = 0, which is deﬁned by
¯ η = φ(ν) or, equivalently, by ν = −θη(¯ η). Since θηη > 0 by assumption (1), this curve has a
negative slope.
























Figure 3: Dynamics of capital
there is a unique path satisfying the transversality conditions.12 It is indicated by the
arrows pointing towards the equilibrium point. If the capital stock is initially lower
than the equilibrium value K∗,the shadow price µK is higher than its equilibrium
value. Consequently,net investment is positive and the capital stock increases until
it reaches (asymptotically) equilibrium.
To illustrate the dynamic properties of the model,consider the impact of an un-
expected energy price shock. If ﬁrms perceive this price increase to be permanent,
speciﬁc energy consumption and the capital stock (unadjusted for quality) will be
lower and labor demand will be higher at the new equilibrium. The paths of these
variables toward their new equilibrium values are depicted in ﬁgure 4,which in-
cludes the two phase diagrams and a diagram showing the evolution of the principal
variables over time (expressed as relative deviations from the initial equilibrium).
The initial equilibrium is denoted by the subscript 0,and the equilibrium after
the energy price increase by the subscript 1. In the ﬁrst phase diagram of ﬁgure 4,
the energy price increase shifts the horizontal line (on which ν is constant) upwards.
Since the price increase is expected to be permanent,the shadow price ν,equal
to the present discounted value of future energy prices,jumps at once to the new
equilibrium level. This jump translates into an immediate change in ﬁrm behavior:
new investment goods are chosen to be more energy-eﬃcient (i.e. η is cut down to
the new equilibrium level). However,the average energy eﬃciency of the capital
stock,¯η,only declines progressively,because it takes time to replace old,ineﬃcient

































Figure 4: Dynamic eﬀects of an energy price increase
15capital goods by new,more energy-eﬃcient ones.
The behavior of the capital stock, K,can be read from the second phase diagram
of ﬁgure 4. The change in the shadow price of energy, ν,aﬀects the equilibrium
value of the shadow price of capital services, µK,because the latter includes the
cost of energy. Since the equilibrium capital stock is lowered by the energy price
increase,the ﬁrm expects higher marginal productivity of capital in the future.
Consequently,the shadow price µK jumps immediately onto the saddle path and
subsequently converges towards the new equilibrium. At the same time,the capital
stock K diminishes slowly.
How does investment react to the energy price increase? It can be shown that
the negative impact of the shock (increasing energy costs and higher price of the in-
vestment good) prevails over the positive eﬀect (higher future marginal productivity
of capital). Therefore,the investment volume drops at once and converges subse-
quently to the new equilibrium value13. If the measure of investment is adjusted for
improved energy eﬃciency (ˆ I),the results change. The energy price increase leads
to a quality improvement of investment goods which may (or may not) compensate
the drop in the volume of investment.
Finally,the evolution of derived energy demand, E,is conditioned by the evo-
lution of the capital stock and its average energy eﬃciency. As shown above,the
two latter variables adjust progressively to the new equilibrium. Therefore,energy
demand diminishes slowly over time and tends towards the new equilibrium.
As in the standard q-theory of investment,rational expectations of future events
inﬂuence present decisions in this model. For example,if an energy price increase
was preannounced (as might be the case for energy or carbon taxes),the choice of
energy eﬃciency and of investment volume would begin to change before the price
increase becomes eﬀective.
6 Energy price shocks and adjustment costs
Turn now to the implications of this model for the estimation of adjustment cost
parameters. This section uses a simulation model,which is calibrated on aggregate
US data for the period following the two ﬁrst energy price shocks,in order to generate
data on the evolution of the investment rate and average q. Then a “conventional”
q-model is estimated on the basis of this artiﬁcial data. The main result of this
13The initial impact may be bigger or smaller than the equilibrium impact. After the initial fall,
the investment rate increases progressively. However, this does not imply that the investment level
increases, since the capital stock diminishes over time.
16exercise is that the “true” marginal adjustment costs are overestimated by a factor
of ﬁve.
There are two major diﬀerences between this model and conventional q-models of
investment (e.g. Summers,1981,Hayashi,1982). First,the investment rate,which
is explained by the investment function,is not deﬁned in the same way. Equation
(17) of the model explains the investment rate I/K,whereas conventional models
explain the quality-adjusted investment rate ˆ I/ˆ K. The relation between the two
concepts can be expressed using equation (5),as follows:
ˆ I/ˆ K = θI/(¯ θK)=( I/K) − (˙ ¯ θ/¯ θ) (29)
As a positive energy price shock leads both to a fall in average q and to the choice
of more energy-eﬃcient equipment,( ˙ ¯ θ/¯ θ) is likely to be negatively correlated with
average q. This correlation should also be observed with negative shocks.
Second,average q is not the only determinant of the investment rate in this
model,as equation (17) makes clear. Equation (19) suggests that the additional
term X might play an important role in periods with large energy price shocks,
since [(¯ η−η)/η]2 can be expected to vary considerably. Because of this square term,
the correlation between qA and X can be expected to be negative in case of positive
energy price shocks,and positive in case of negative shocks.
The simulation model is set up in discrete time and has the same structure as
the theoretical model of this paper. Functional speciﬁcations and parameters which
describe the structure of production are taken from Atkeson and Kehoe (1999),who
use aggregate US data for the period 1960–1994. The two production functions f
and g (from which θ is derived) are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas,and the cost shares
are 0.57 for labor and 0.043 for energy (which are the average cost shares over the
period 1960–1994 in US non-energy sectors).
Adjustment costs (7) are speciﬁed as: h(I/K)=( b/2)[(I/K)−c]2/(I/K). As a
consequence,the investment function ψ in (17) is linear:
I/K =( 1 /b)
 
θ(¯ η,t)(q
A − 1) + X
 
+ c (30)
What values should the adjustment cost parameters of the “true” model take? The
recent consensus seems to be that marginal adjustment costs are much lower than
what was found in the early literature (Caballero,1999; Hassett and Hubbard,1997).
However,conventional models still yields estimates of b which are closer to 20 than


































Figure 5: Simulated energy price shocks
“true” model is chosen such that the estimation of a conventional q-model on the
basis of the simulated data comes close to the conventional estimates (see table 1
below). As a result of this trial and error procedure, b is set to 4 in the simulation
model. The adjustment parameter c is assumed to be equal to the depreciation rate
δ,which is set to 0.1. The real interest rate is ﬁxed at 0.05.
The evolution of the energy price is simulated such that it is consistent with
Atkeson and Kehoe’s (1999) data. Using the annual energy price data for the US
1960–1994,these authors estimate an ARMA(1, 1) energy price process:
logvt+1 =( 1− ρ)log¯ v + ρlogvt + γ t−1 +  t,  t ∼ N(0,σ
2
p), (31)
and obtain the following results: ρ =0 .9, γ =0 .35 and σp =0 .108. Here it is
assumed that ﬁrms form their expectations of energy prices on the basis of this
process. As the simulation model is deterministic,this assumption implies that,
after a shock,the energy price is expected to follow the trajectory deﬁned by (31),
ignoring the possibility of future shocks.
Two types of energy price shocks are simulated (see ﬁgure 5). They are assumed
to be unexpected by ﬁrms and can be seen as a “stylized” representation of the
1974 and 1979 oil price shocks,as they appear in the aggregate data constructed










































Figure 6: Impact of single energy price shock
First,a single shock is simulated by setting  0 to 0.3. As a result,the energy price
reaches a maximum (54% higher than the initial level) at t = 2,then it falls back
slowly to the new equilibrium ¯ v,which is assumed to be 35% higher than the initial
energy price level v0.14 Second,a double shock is simulated by adding to the initial
impulse a second shock,by setting  5 to 0.4. With this second shock,the energy
price reaches a second maximum,141% percent higher than v0,at t =7 . T h e
simulated trajectory of the energy price which results from these two shocks reﬂects
approximately the actual evolution.15
The simulation model is now used to generate data on average q and investment
rates over 21 annual periods (corresponding to the period 1974–1994). Figures 6 and
7 show the evolution of these variables and illustrate the two main eﬀects of energy
price shocks. First,as ﬁrms choose more energy-eﬃcient equipment after an energy
price shock,the quality adjusted measure of investment, ˆ I/ˆ K,varies less than I/K.
On the other hand,as average q neglects the investment incentive represented by
quality-upgrading and captured by X,it falls more than qM.
If a conventional q-model is estimated on the basis of this simulated data,
marginal adjustment costs are overestimated by a factor of ﬁve (see fourth and
sixth column of table 1). As mentioned above,this conventional q-model uses a
14In Atkeson and Kehoe’s (1999) data, the average energy price ¯ v is about 35% higher than the
energy price in 1974.











































Figure 7: Impact of double energy price shock
Table 1: Estimation of adjustment cost parameters
“True” Estimations (OLS)a
modelb Single shock Double shock
I/K ˆ I/ˆ K
qM − 1 0.25 0.076 0.082
(0.013) (0.013)
qA − 1 0.051 0.049
(0.009) (0.009)
constant 0.10 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
R2 0.63 0.62 0.68 0.63
D.W. 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.14
aNumber of observations=21. Standard errors between parentheses.
bThe independent variable in the true model is in fact (qM −1)θ.I f( qM −1)
is used instead, the estimated coeﬃcient is equal to 0.26.
20diﬀerent deﬁnition of the investment rate than the “true” model and neglects the
inﬂuence of the term X. In order to identify the contribution of these two factors,
another version of the model is estimated,where the quality-adjusted investment
rate is regressed on marginal q (see third and ﬁfth columns of table 1). It is clear
from these results that the strong negative correlation between (˙ ¯ θ/¯ θ)a n dqA (-0.96
over the estimation period) is responsible for an important part of the estimation
bias.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a deterministic investment model where capital and energy
are linked by a putty-clay relationship. The model is tractable enough to allow a
simple and intuitive analysis of the behavior of investment demand in the presence of
energy price shocks. Moreover,the endogenous wedge between marginal and average
q,which is a result of the putty-clay structure,can be described as a function of
some key parameters and variables. If there are large energy price shocks,the model
exhibits dynamic behavior which suggests that marginal adjustment costs will be
overestimated by conventional q-models. Exploratory simulation analysis indicates
that this bias might be quite serious,suggesting therefore a new explanation of the
empirical failure of conventional q-models.
Several extensions and applications of this model seem promising. First,the
analysis of this paper is limited by the use of a deterministic set-up. Incorporating
explicitly the uncertainty of energy prices would thus represent an important step
forward. Second,the putty-clay framework is well suited for the analysis of embodied
technical change,an issue which has (again) become prominent as a consequence
of the empirical work by Gordon (1990). By contrast to the putty-putty model
employed by Greenwood et al. (2000),the putty-clay framework shifts the emphasis
towards the question of factor bias. Indeed,capital-saving technical progress leads
to the economic depreciation of existing capital goods; this eﬀects works through
a fall in average q. By contrast,energy-saving technical progress favors the second
investment motive and thus increases the wedge between marginal and average q.
Third,the exploratory simulations carried out in this paper call for econometric
studies which would take the putty-clay structure of capital and energy (and possibly
other inputs) explicitly into account. The model proposed in this paper is not
only consistent,but also simpler than the theoretical framework used in previous
empirical work (see e.g. Berndt and Wood,1984).
21Appendix
Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for cost minimization
In the original cost minimization problem (9),the suﬃcient conditions provided by
the theorems of Mangasarian and Arrow do not apply. However,a canonical change
in variables (see Gelfand and Fomin,1963,p.77) transforms the original problem
into a modiﬁed problem to which the theorems of Mangasarian and Arrow apply In
this appendix,the necessary and suﬃcient conditions of the modiﬁed problem are
described.
Recall that the state variables are K and ¯ η and the controls I and η.T h e
proposed change in variables is: replace ¯ η by E =¯ ηK. For all K  = 0,the function
deﬁning the change in variables is a one-to-one correspondence.
The problem of the ﬁrm can now be restated,The ﬁrm minimizes the present




−rt[V (w,K,Y)+vE + θ(η)I + C(I,K)]dt
where the paths of state variables are constrained by the following diﬀerential equa-
tions:
˙ K = I − δK (A1)
˙ E = Iη− δE (A2)
The ﬁrst of these diﬀerential equations is unchanged [see equation (2)]. The second
is obtained by diﬀerentiating E =¯ ηK with respect to time and by using equations
(2) and (4) of the original model. The initial conditions are: K(0) = K0 and
E(0) = ¯ η0K0 = E0.
The current-value Hamiltonian is deﬁned by:
H = −[V (w,K,Y)+vE + θ(η)I + C(I,K)] + µK(I − δK)+µE(Iη− δE)
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle provides the necessary conditions of this prob-
lem. Let I∗ and η∗ be a solution of the problem deﬁned above and let K∗ and
E∗ be the optimal paths of the associated state variables. Necessary conditions for
optimality are given by the following equations:
˙ µK = CK(I
∗,K
∗)+VK(w,K
∗,Y)+µK(r + δ) (A3)
˙ µE = v + µE(r + δ) (A4)
22where µK and µE are auxiliary variables associated with state variables K and E.
Moreover,the Maximum Principle includes the condition that the control vari-
ables maximize the Hamiltonian. First,setting the derivatives of the Hamiltonian








Second,it has to be established that the Hamiltonian is concave in ( I,η). The
matrix of second derivatives of H with respect to I and η is negative deﬁned since,
for all I,K,η  =0 :
∂
2H/∂I
2 = −CII(I,K) < 0
∂
2H/∂η
2 = −θηη(η,t)I< 0
∂
2H/∂I∂η = µE − θη(η,t)= 0
The signs of the two ﬁrst expression follow from the convexity assumptions.
For the necessary transversality conditions,we refer to a theorem by Seierstad
(see Seierstad and Sydsaeter,1987,p.244). Denote by:
g1(K,E,I,η)=I − δK and g2(K,E,I,η)=Iη− δE
the functions appearing in diﬀerential equations (A1) and (A2). The theorem es-
tablishes that if there exists a number k such that,for all t:
   
     
∂gi
∂K
   
      ≤ k and
   
     
∂gi
∂E
   
      ≤ ki =1 ,2
then the auxiliary variables µK and µE,solutions of equations (A3) and (A4),satisfy:
lim
t→∞e
−rtµK(t) = 0 and lim
t→∞e
−rtµE(t)=0 . (A7)














23Following Mangasarian’s theorem16,the conditions of the Maximum Principle
are also suﬃcient if the Hamiltonian H is jointly concave in the state and control
variables (K,E,I,η) and if a transversality condition,given below,is satisﬁed.
The concavity of the Hamiltonian can be established by showing that the Hessian
matrix of H is semi-deﬁned negative:










































   
 

−CII 0 −CIK 0
0 −θηη(η,t)I 00
−CKKI 0 −VKK − CKK 0
00 0 0

   
 

The determinant of the complete matrix is zero. The principal minor with order
2 is the matrix of second derivatives of H with respect to (I,η),which is negative
deﬁnite as shown above. In order to establish the concavity of the Hamiltonian,it
remains thus to be shown that the determinant of the principal minor with order 3
is negative. This determinant is equal to:
−θηηI (CIICKK − CIK + CIIVKK).
Since the adjustment cost function C(I,K) is assumed to be homogeneous of de-
gree 1,the Hessian matrix of C is singular. Consequently:
CIICKK − CIK =0 .
Because of the convexity assumptions on C(I,K)a n dθ(η) and since VKK > 0,the
determinant of the principal minor with order 3 is negative.




∗(t)) + µE(t)(E(t) − E
∗(t))] ≥ 0
for all admissible K(t),E(t) [satisfying the initial conditions and diﬀerential equa-
tions (A1) and (A2)]. Obviously,the necessary transversality condition (A7) implies
the suﬃcient transversality condition (the expression above is zero).
16For a precise statement of this theorem in the context of inﬁnite horizons, see Seierstad and
Sydsaeter (1987, p.234f). Note that if Mangasarian’s theorem applies, the suﬃcient conditions of
Arrow’s theorem are also satisﬁed.
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